

Freedom of Information request: Reference number FOI2026/00940

Date of request: 7th August 2026

Request:

Request for recorded information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004

I am a resident and leaseholder at Bridge House, 6 Waterworks Yard, Croydon CR0 1UL.

I understand from the Brigade's published guidance that individual fire reports are treated as a chargeable service and are exempt under section 21 of the Freedom of Information Act, and that incident records are published as open data on the London Datastore. I have obtained and analysed the published incident data and I am not asking for it here. This request is confined to material that is not covered by either.

My first request is a single narrow question. The published data redacts the full postcode for residential incidents, so dwellings can only be located to a 50 metre grid square, and the squares covering Bridge House contain other buildings. I cannot therefore tell from the open data which incidents relate to my building.

1. Please confirm which, if any, of the following incident numbers relate to Bridge House, 6 Waterworks Yard, Croydon CR0 1UL. A simple yes or no against each would be sufficient and I do not need any further detail about the incidents themselves.

1. 054691-04052019, 4 May 2019, 23:25
2. 055295-06052019, 6 May 2019, 08:21
3. 055679-07052019, 7 May 2019, 01:46
4. 064322-24052019, 24 May 2019, 00:08
5. 065824-26052019, 26 May 2019, 19:57
6. 069431-02062019, 2 June 2019, 20:26
7. 069455-02062019, 2 June 2019, 21:09
8. 069483-02062019, 2 June 2019, 22:19
9. 069636-03062019, 3 June 2019, 07:36
10. 069643-03062019, 3 June 2019, 08:10
11. 069651-03062019, 3 June 2019, 08:59
12. 056948-04042025, 4 April 2025, 22:30
13. 058394-06042025, 6 April 2025, 19:24
14. 109306-20062025, 20 June 2025, 04:54
15. 232562-12122025, 12 December 2025, 22:14
16. 035465-25022026, 25 February 2026, 23:01
17. 039817-05032026, 5 March 2026, 03:31
18. 040536-06032026, 6 March 2026, 08:10
19. 041226-07032026, 7 March 2026, 09:30

20. 064375-11042026, 11 April 2026, 07:15

A numbered reply against each, for example "1. no, 2. yes", would be entirely sufficient.

I also request the following recorded information:

2. Any record of the joint inspection of Bridge House carried out on 16 May 2019 by the London Fire Brigade together with the London Borough of Croydon's Environmental Health and Antisocial Behaviour teams. That inspection is referred to in an email from the, Senior Environmental Health Officer at the London Borough of Croydon, dated 21 May 2019, which states: "I arranged for a joint inspection on 16 May 2019 of the above block with the London Fire Brigade, Croydon's Antisocial Behaviour Team and myself (Environmental Health)."

LFB holds records of a Fire Safety inspection on the 23rd July 2019 on our Farynor database. A Notification of Deficiencies is noted as issued on the 11th September 2019.

3. Any record of an audit or inspection of Bridge House carried out by the Brigade under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, and any enforcement notice, prohibition notice, alterations notice or deficiency notice issued in respect of the building.

4. Any correspondence between the London Fire Brigade and the London Borough of Croydon, Radcliffe Investment Properties Limited, Inspired Property Management Limited, HML or Moat Homes Limited concerning fire safety at Bridge House since 1 January 2019.

5. Any record of the Brigade having required, requested or recommended interim measures at Bridge House, including any waking watch or increased security presence. I ask because the managing agent stated in writing to leaseholders in 2021 that security staff were on site "to help appease the fire brigade", and separately that "the fire brigade would ideally prefer to see a system of alarms wired into the flats".

6. Any record held by the Brigade of the fire evacuation strategy for Bridge House, and of any change from a stay put strategy to simultaneous evacuation.

If the Brigade holds a report for the basement fire of 6 May 2019 and that report is available as a chargeable service rather than under the Act, please tell me the cost and how to order it, and treat that part as a request for that information rather than for the report itself.

I understand that some of this may constitute environmental information within regulation 2(1) of the 2004 Regulations, and I am content for the Brigade to handle it under whichever regime it considers correct.

I do not seek the personal data of any individual involved in any incident, and I am content for names and any identifying details of residents or casualties to be redacted.

If any part is refused, please state the exemption or exception relied on and confirm the internal review procedure.

Response:

Further to your request, please see the response below.

1. Please confirm which, if any, of the following incident numbers relate to Bridge House, 6 Waterworks Yard, Croydon CR0 1UL. A simple yes or no against each would be sufficient and I do not need any further detail about the incidents themselves.

<i>1. 054691-04052019, 4 May 2019, 23:25</i>	Yes
<i>2. 055295-06052019, 6 May 2019, 08:21</i>	Yes
<i>3. 055679-07052019, 7 May 2019, 01:46</i>	Yes
<i>4. 064322-24052019, 24 May 2019, 00:08</i>	Yes
<i>5. 065824-26052019, 26 May 2019, 19:57</i>	No
<i>6. 069431-02062019, 2 June 2019, 20:26</i>	Yes
<i>7. 069455-02062019, 2 June 2019, 21:09</i>	Yes
<i>8. 069483-02062019, 2 June 2019, 22:19</i>	Yes
<i>9. 069636-03062019, 3 June 2019, 07:36</i>	Yes
<i>10. 069643-03062019, 3 June 2019, 08:10</i>	Yes
<i>11. 069651-03062019, 3 June 2019, 08:59</i>	Yes

<i>12. 056948-04042025, 4 April 2025, 22:30</i>	Yes
<i>13. 058394-06042025, 6 April 2025, 19:24</i>	Yes
<i>14. 109306-20062025, 20 June 2025, 04:54</i>	Yes
<i>15. 232562-12122025, 12 December 2025, 22:14</i>	Yes
<i>16. 035465-25022026, 25 February 2026, 23:01</i>	No
<i>17. 039817-05032026, 5 March 2026, 03:31</i>	No
<i>18. 040536-06032026, 6 March 2026, 08:10</i>	No
<i>19. 041226-07032026, 7 March 2026, 09:30</i>	No
<i>20. 064375-11042026, 11 April 2026, 07:15</i>	Yes

2. Any record of the joint inspection of Bridge House carried out on 16 May 2019 by the London Fire Brigade together with the London Borough of Croydon's Environmental Health and Antisocial Behaviour teams. That inspection is referred to in an email from the, Senior Environmental Health Officer at the London Borough of Croydon, dated 21 May 2019, which states: "I arranged for a joint inspection on 16 May 2019 of the above block with the London Fire Brigade, Croydon's Antisocial Behaviour Team and myself (Environmental Health)."

The LFB Fire Safety team were contacted to check if any meetings were held on this date. There is no record of a meeting being held on the 16th May 2019. It may be that a staff member attended but this was not recorded. We are happy to check records again if you have a name of an individual.

3. Any record of an audit or inspection of Bridge House carried out by the Brigade under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, and any enforcement notice, prohibition notice, alterations notice or deficiency notice issued in respect of the building.

LFB have completed further Fire Safety audits for 6 Waterworks, Croydon, CR0 1UL on the 3rd December 2024. The result of the audit was an Enforcement Notice - consider prosecution. A letter was issued to the local authority, Croydon Borough Council as London Fire Brigade would not take action as Croydon Council were acting as the Lead Authority. Please see below for a copy of the Letter following the Fire Safety Inspection. Personal data has been redacted in accordance with [section 40 of the FOIA - Personal Information](#).

4. Any correspondence between the London Fire Brigade and the London Borough of Croydon, Radcliffe Investment Properties Limited, Inspired Property Management Limited, HML or Moat Homes Limited concerning fire safety at Bridge House since 1 January 2019.

With regards to questions 3 to 5, LFB holds correspondence with London Borough of Croydon and the above property management companies. However, correspondence is exempt from release [under section 31 of the FOIA - Law Enforcement](#).

The LFB freely provide the outcome of Fire Safety Audits and notices issued under freedom of information act.

Where a Fire Safety audit results in a notice being issued by the LFB, the reports themselves are exempt from release under the FOIA provisions under [Section 31 of the FOIA - law enforcement](#) (Section 31(1)(g) combined with 31(2) (a) and 31(2) (c)).

When the LFB identifies any safety concerns, we make this information available to the public by supplying copies of any informal notification of fire safety deficiencies (NOD) issued, and through access to [the public register](#) of any formal enforcement action. We clearly understand that there is public interest and concern about knowing about the fire safety of the buildings in which people live, work or visit however we need to maintain a balance between the public interest in safety and the Brigade's ability to work with responsible

persons in a safe space where honest, frank and meaningful discussions can take place.

It is important that enforcing authorities are assisted in their investigations if witnesses and those responsible for compliance with regulations are willing to cooperate with the investigation on a voluntary basis and investigators are able to take full contemporaneous notes (that are recorded on the audit forms) and enter in discussions (either verbally, or by correspondence) with those involved to enable them to explore all aspects of the case and then arrive at a decision as to the appropriate action to take.

Correspondence and notes

Other materials (including email correspondence and detailed notes), documents (such as documents provided to us by the responsible person for the building) and other fire safety information held by the Brigade are also exempt from access via the FOIA provisions. Again, we consider these to be exempt under [Section 31 of the FOIA \("law enforcement"](#) - Section 31(1)(g) combined with 31(2) (a) and 31(2) (c)).

We are of the view that the correct balance between the public interest in building safety and our ongoing regulatory involvement lies in making information about enforcement action available (formal or informal) to those that request it, but in withholding the supporting information and evidence gathered during regulation activities.

5. Any record of the Brigade having required, requested or recommended interim measures at Bridge House, including any waking watch or increased security presence. I ask because the managing agent stated in writing to leaseholders in 2021 that security staff were on site "to help appease the fire brigade", and separately that "the fire brigade would ideally prefer to see a system of alarms wired into the flats".

Waking watches in unsafe buildings are not imposed by the fire service, they are put in place by the person responsible for fire safety in each building, such as the building owner or manager, based on the findings and recommendations of a competent fire safety person and should be captured as part of their Fire Risk Assessment.

While the Brigade has a role in enforcing fire safety legislation, it does not make a decision on which interim measures are put in place in a building. However, the Brigade's fire safety inspectors will not leave an unsafe building without any safety measures in place due to the significant risk to residents. The Brigade accepts that in some cases a waking watch is the only viable option until a common alarm is fitted, other than evacuating the whole building.

Upon review of the documents provided in relation to this building, there is no reference in correspondence to a waking watch being provided. The LFB Operational Risk database has a record of no waking watch for Bridge House, 6 Waterworks Yard.

Further information can be found on the LFB website, here: <https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/news/2022-news/january/brigade-clarifies-implementation-of-waking-watches-and-other-interim-fire-safety-measures/>

6. Any record held by the Brigade of the fire evacuation strategy for Bridge House, and of any change from a stay put strategy to simultaneous evacuation.

The Fire Safety audit from December 2024 contains an entry regarding the evacuation strategy. The simultaneous evacuation strategy is currently in place. Details are below:

SAFETY CRITICAL

Safety Evaluation

Broadly Compliant

Observations

There is currently a simultaneous evacuation strategy in place due to compartmentation issues and the non-compliant external wall. Fire action notices state the current evacuation strategy and x5 residents. I spoke to have confirmed their understanding.

The simultaneous evacuation strategy has been confirmed in the FRA and FRAEW.

If the Brigade holds a report for the basement fire of 6 May 2019 and that report is available as a chargeable service rather than under the Act, please tell me the cost and how to order it, and treat that part as a request for that information rather than for the report itself.

Please see below for a copy of the Confirmation of Attendance (CoA) report for the 6th May 2019.

We have dealt with your request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. For more information about this process please see the guidance we publish about making a request on our website: <https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/about-us/transparency/request-information-from-us/>

Private Sector Housing Manager
London Borough of Croydon
3rd Floor Zone B
Bernard Weatherill House
8 Mint Walk, Croydon
CR0 1EA

The London Fire Commissioner is the
fire and rescue authority for London

Date: 19 December 2024
Our Ref: 20/193762/BA

FAO

Dear Sir/Madam

FIRE SAFETY INSPECTION

Premises: Bridge House, 6 Waterworks Yard, Croydon CR0 1UL

The London Fire Commissioner (the Commissioner) is the fire and rescue authority for London. The Commissioner is responsible for enforcing the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (as amended) in London.

An authorised officer has recently carried out an inspection of the above-mentioned premises.

During the inspection, deficiencies relating to public safety were noted. **We are not taking action ourselves but as you are the lead authority for these premises, I enclose details of our findings.**

Article	Area of Concern	Steps Considered necessary to remedy the contravention.
Article 11	At the time of the audit your preventative and protective measures had not been planned, organised, controlled, monitored or reviewed where required. It was found that: 1) You had not controlled, monitored or reviewed the storage of combustible materials in the communal means of escape. Residents' personal items were being stored in the escape stairs on floors 2, 3 & 6, along the corridors on floor 5 and outside balconies on all floors. 2) You had not planned and organised a robust management policy to manage tampering of the automatic detection and warning system installed within flats, which poses a danger to the residents in the event of a fire, as they will not get early warning of external fire spread.	Arrangements identified as not suitably addressed must be effectively planned, organised, controlled, monitored or reviewed.

Article 11 continued	3) You had not planned or organised the replacement of the missing 'Dry riser inlet' signage for the dry riser inlet adjacent to the main entrance. 4) Quarterly checks of all the communal fire doors in the building had not been planned and organised in line with Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022. These are to be recorded and made available to residents. 5) Annual checks of the flat front doors (including the self closing device) had not been planned and organised in line with Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022. These are to be recorded and made available to residents. 6) You had not planned or organised remedial works be carried out to the emergency lighting system following a maintenance report carried out by Canam in March 2024, where 43 emergency lights failed the test. 7) You had not planned and organised sharing of electronic building plans with the Fire and Rescue Service as per Regulation 6 of the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022. 8) Implementing all recommendations detailed in the Risk Improvement Programme detailed in your fire risk assessment dated 23 October 2023 had not been planned and organised. No evidence was shown to demonstrate that dates had been planned and organised for these remedial works. 9) Smoking within the premises had not been controlled or monitored. Discarded smoking material was observed at the base of the North Staircase.	
Article 13	At the time of the audit you had not provided an appropriate method of fire detection and warning within your premises. It was found that: 1) The automatic fire detection and warning system had not been installed in the staircase which was enclosed in Polycarbonate (Plastic) Panels and served as an escape route. 2) The automatic fire detection and warning system had not been installed in all flats. As detailed in the commissioning certificate dated 02 August 2023, the wireless system installed	Provide an appropriate means of fire detection and giving warning in the common parts of the premises. This can be achieved by: 1) Ensuring the automatic detection and warning system is extended to cover all areas exposed to the non-compliant cladding system. 2) Ensuring the wireless fire alarm system is installed in all flats.

Article 13 continued	by Clarkson Safety had not been installed in flats [REDACTED]	
Article 14	At the time of the audit the emergency routes or exits were inadequate. It was found that: 1) Residents were storing items along the communal means of escape which may prevent relevant persons from evacuating safely. Combustible items in the form of prams, a bed frame, cardboard and plasterboard were stored along the central staircase. Combustible items in the form of scooters, bags, pots and a bicycle were stored along the corridor on the 5th floor. Additional combustible items were stored along the balcony on all floors. 2) The protected corridors had inadequate FIRE RESISTANCE. There was a lack of fire stopping above the false ceiling in the 1st floor office which could allow smoke and fire to spread onto the corridor. There was also an excessive amount of pink coloured expanding foam, which is not considered to be of limited combustibility given the amount used, which had been used to inadequately fire stop penetrations above cross corridor doors on all floors. 3) The protected staircase had inadequate FIRE RESISTANCE. Plasterboard on the 3rd floor central staircase had been removed due to water damage and had not been replaced, the hole in the wall compromises the FIRE RESISTANCE of the PROTECTED ROUTE. 4) The southwest facing stair core (FRAEW wall type 6), which is enclosed in Polycarbonate (Plastic) Panels was in use as a fire exit despite not having adequate FIRE RESISTANCE.	Ensure adequate emergency routes and exits, for use by relevant persons in the premises, are available and can be safely and effectively used at all relevant times. This can be achieved by: 1) Ensuring all communal areas and escape routes remain free from combustible items. 2 & 3) Ensuring all PROTECTED ROUTES have adequate FIRE RESISTANCE. 4) Ensuring all fire escape routes have adequate FIRE RESISTANCE.
Article 17	The corridors, lobbies and stairs used for access to and from flats in the premises (the access route(s)) are intended for use by relevant persons as a PROTECTED ROUTE. This route should provide a safe means of escape in event of fire and must be maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working order and good repair. During the audit it was found that the responsible person for management of the access route has not prevented or addressed deficiencies in the FIRE RESISTANCE of the	Ensure the access corridor is returned to its intended state as a PROTECTED ROUTE to afford protection from fire in a flat to relevant persons who may require use of that corridor for safe escape from the premises in case of fire. Remedial work that may be necessary for this purpose, must be assessed and completed by a competent person who is practised in application of the relevant standards for means of escape. Your

Article 17 continued	PROTECTED ROUTE and/or required rectification of defects that have arisen in, and/or alterations made to, the protection to the access route. For example, the front door to Flats [REDACTED] did not fully self-close into their frames. The PROTECTED ROUTE has been compromised by the fitting of doors that do not provide 30 minutes fire protection to the access route.	attention is drawn to the provisions of subsections (2) (3) and (4) of Article 17 of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in the attached extracts of legislation. You are advised that walls in PROTECTED ROUTES should have a minimum of 60 minutes FIRE RESISTANCE. Openings in the walls leading to accommodation off a PROTECTED ROUTE (including doors in entrance ways, service openings, borrowed light glazing, holes around cables trunking and pipework) should be of a minimum 30 minutes FIRE RESISTANCE. Available means the responsible person could use to comply with Article 17 (1) may include enforcing terms of lease and Landlord and Tenant / Property legislation as lessor/owner.
Article 17	At the time of the audit you had not ensured that a suitable system of maintenance was in place in your premises. It was found that: 1) Communal fire doors had not been subjected to a suitable schedule of maintenance. The magnetic lock device attached to the door leading to the bin room had exposed wiring, other doors in the basement were damaged and not fitting into their frame and damage was observed to riser cupboard doors on the ground and first floor. 2) Emergency lighting was not in working order on the ground and first floor in the central staircase. No evidence has been provided to show the remedial works highlighted in the maintenance report carried out by Canam in March 2024 have been carried out.	Arrange initial and ongoing maintenance to ensure fire safety measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by: 1) Ensuring all communal doors are subjected to 3 monthly checks, with remedial works being carried out to ensure they are being maintained to the required standards. 2) Ensuring all emergency lighting is in efficient working order.
Article 22	At the time of the audit you had not cooperated and coordinated with other responsible persons. It was found that you had not informed other occupants and Responsible Persons of the risks associated with the external wall. Information relating to areas of higher fire risk, should be exchanged with Moat Housing Association, the commercial units and any flats operating web-based accommodation (i.e. flat no [REDACTED]) and coordination should be carried out to consider significant findings and reduce the risks.	You must take all reasonable steps to cooperate and coordinate with other responsible persons. In particular provide necessary information to responsible persons to allow for proper assessment of risk and establishment of emergency action plans and cooperate and coordinate with other responsible persons. With specific consideration given to identify and share information on areas of higher fire risk.

Article 38	At the time of the audit a suitable system of maintenance of the firefighting measures was not in place. It was found that the following failures will delay firefighting in the event of a fire: 1) You had not provided user instructions for the AOV control panel to assist firefighters in the event of an emergency. 2) There was a lack of signage for AOV manual control points, it was unclear what the use and function of each manual control point was. 3) Wayfinding signage was missing from the opposite wall to the firefighting lift on all floors.	Arrange initial and ongoing maintenance to ensure firefighting measures are kept in an efficient state, working order and good repair. This can be achieved by: 1) Providing a basic user guide for the AOV control panel to assist firefighters in the event of an emergency. 2) Ensuring manual control points and control and indicating equipment is clearly identified to indicate their use and function. 3) Providing adequate wayfinding signage in all the required locations conforming to the specifications and location set out in paragraph 15.14 to 15.16 Approved Document B Volume 1 2019 edition incorporating 2020 amendments.
Article 8	At the time of the audit the general fire precautions as identified in the significant findings of your fire risk assessment had not been implemented. It was found that the following tasks identified in your fire risk assessment had not been actioned: - T#2023-196008 – fire door defects (due by 23/01/2024) - T#2023-196018 – engage with residents (due by 23/12/2023) - T#2023-198051 – Fire separation other. The windows adjacent to the car park should be kept shut and only open when being monitored. Windows on floor 1-3 facing this car park were found to be open during audit.	Implement the significant findings of your fire risk assessment, in particular, T#2023-196008, #2023-196018 and T#2023-198051 must be actioned.
Article 8	At the time of the audit the FIRE RESISTING separation in your premises was inadequate. It was found that: 1) The FIRE RESISTING separation between the basement plant room and ground floor above have been breached due to a hole where cables pass through. 2) The FIRE RESISTING separation from the meter room where a tray holding cables/services runs through the wall had not been appropriately fire stopped.	Provide suitable FIRE RESISTING separation by: 1) Repairing any holes and unsealed gaps around services passing through the ceiling of the basement using appropriate FIRE RESISTING materials. 2) Fire stopping around the hole where the cable tray runs through the wall in the meter room. These works must be completed by a competent person, who is practiced in the application of relevant standards.

Article 9	At the time of the audit the fire risk assessment for your premises was not suitable and sufficient. It was found that: 1) A comprehensive review of the scope/extent of the temporary fire alarm system to support simultaneous evacuation. The fire risk assessment has not ensured that all areas where the risk is posed by non-compliant external wall system as per the FRAEW report are covered to provide an early warning to the residents should a fire occur in any of these high risk areas. 2) The fire risk assessment had not considered inadequate fire exit signage in the following locations: i) Floor 2, 'fire exit' outside flat [REDACTED] leading to Qpark. Exit is locked between 18.00 and 08.00 and is not suitable as a fire exit. ii) Lack of fire exit signage from balconies to all floors of the North staircase. iii) Lack of fire exit signage from balconies back into the main building to use the central staircase. iv) Lack of fire exit signage to exit leading to the pedestrian walkway at Surrey Street, due to the unsuitable exits for the occupant of flat [REDACTED] this is their escape route, and its suitability should be risk assessed. 3) The fire risk assessment had not considered an assessment and consequences of extended travel distances for flat [REDACTED]. It was noted that the door leading to North staircase and the door that leads to central staircase were locked and only openable by keypad. Occupants of flat [REDACTED] would have to travel in excess of 4.5m to the exit leading to Surrey Street pedestrian walkway without any smoke ventilation arrangements for this flat. 4) The fire risk assessment had not considered the risks associated with the office on 1st floor, near flat [REDACTED]. It was noted that the construction above the fire door separating the office from the residential corridor will not provide 60 minutes of FIRE RESISTANCE, as it does not continue to the full storey height.	The fire risk assessment should be reviewed, with specific consideration given to: 1) Reviewing the scope/extent of the temporary fire alarm system, ensuring all areas where risk is posed by the non-compliant external wall system as detailed in the FRAEW is considered. 2) Fire exit signage throughout the premises. 3) Extended travel distances with a lack of smoke ventilation arrangements for flat [REDACTED] 4) The risks associated with the office on the 1st floor.
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If there are specific fire safety matters about which you are concerned or you have any queries regarding this letter, please contact the person named below. If you are dissatisfied in any way with the response given, please ask to speak to the Team Leader quoting our reference.

Yours faithfully,

[REDACTED]
for Assistant Commissioner (Fire Safety)
Directorate of Operations
[REDACTED]@london-fire.gov.uk

Reply to Inspecting Officer [REDACTED]
Direct T 020 8555 1200 ext [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]@croydon.gov.uk
[REDACTED]@croydon.gov.uk
[REDACTED]@croydon.gov.uk

The Commissioner promotes the installation of sprinkler suppression systems, as there is clear evidence that they are effective in suppressing and extinguishing fires; they can help reduce the numbers of deaths and injuries from fire, and the risk to firefighters.



Confirmation of attendance of London Fire Brigade to a fire incident

Date of report: 06 October 2026

Reference: 055295-06052019/48848

The data presented below have been derived from a computer database. The principal purpose of the database is statistical analysis and to facilitate this analysis, information has been classified into broad categories.

Incident number:	055295-06052019
Fire station ground where fire occurred:	Croydon
Time and date of call to the Brigade:	08:21 hrs 06 May 2019
Origin of call:	Person (mobile)
Recorded time and date of arrival of Brigade:	08:24 hrs 06 May 2019
Recorded time and date incident under control:	09:17 hrs 06 May 2019
Time and date incident closed:	11:23 hrs 06 May 2019

(The address below may not be shown in full as it could result in the disclosure of personal data under the Data Protection Act)

Address qualifier:	Correct incident location
Building name/Number:	6
Flat/Unit name/Number:	
Street:	WATERWORKS YARD
Locality:	
Town:	CROYDON
County:	
Post Code:	CR0 1UL
Further description of location (where required):	
Type of property where fire started:	Purpose Built Flats/Maisonettes - 4 to 9 storeys
Supposed motive for the fire:	Accidental

(Note that the motive for a fire can rarely be determined with certainty and is not the subject of extensive enquiry by the Brigade at fires of this type. The most likely cause that can be ascertained while at the scene of the fire is recorded for Brigade and government statistical purposes only)

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